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EMPIRICAL WORK IN FAMILY LAW
Margaret F. Brinig*
Until fairly recently, researchers have not done much theoretical
work on the subject of family law. Although the move towards theo-
retical work is a positive one, unfortunately, most of the latest reforms
in family law have been uninformed by empirical studies. Further-
more, the few empirical studies that have been conducted are replete
with intractable problems.
In this essay, Margaret Brinig discusses some of the problems
researchers have encountered in their attempts to conduct empirical
work in the area of family law. For example, most researchers have
used state cross-sectional data for their experiments. Reliance on this
type of data can be misleading because a population's characteristics
can vary even within state lines. This casts doubt on whether a re-
searcher's conclusions are generalizable over any particular segment
of the state's population. Additionally, researchers are often forced to
conduct their experiments using incomplete data. Because family law
involves many highly sensitive issues, much of the data that could be
used for empirical studies is not available to the public. Establishing
a true control group has been problematic for the very same reasons.
The author further points out that much of the empirical work has
been conducted by individuals with a stake in the outcome of their re-
search. For example, a researcher who was a single father conducted
a well-known study on the effects of father custody on children.
The author implores researchers and legislators to stop reacting
so quickly to a particular study. First, she argues that many experi-
ments are not generalizable over other populations. An experiment in
Minnesota suggested that mandatory arrest of domestic abusers led to
a low rate of recidivism. Courts and legislators reacted to these fig-
ures with swift reform. Future experiments, however, uncovered that
mandatory arrest only works when the abuser has a stake in the
community or employer reputation. Otherwise, mandatory arrest ac-
* Professor of Law, University oflowa.
Most of my own empirical education has come from the valuable help of others, not usually in
family law. In addition to those who have been coauthors, I count among these Barry Adler, Ian Ayres,
Christopher Bruce, Bruce Kobayashi, David Levy, Fred McChesney, Mark Ramseyer, Sam Rea, and
Robert Tollison. I have been privileged to work over the years (in chronological order) with Michael
Alexeev, Steven Crafton, Frank Buckley, Doug Allen, and Steven Nock and have learned volumes from
each of them.
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tually increases recidivism. Second, there is evidence that individuals
do not care about what a particular law says. The author cautions us
that we should not credit the existence of a particular law for any be-
havior in a population. Future research should try to eliminate other
possible causes. The author concludes this essay by suggesting that
future research should focus on topics such as the nonfinancial costs
of divorce on the family, the effects of various custody patterns on
children, the relative costs of divorce and staying together, and, in the
case of adoption, whether good or bad parents can be identified in
advance.
Family law was for a long time an area in which there was not a
great deal of deep theoretical work.' Perhaps this was because most
people viewed family practice as tainted, though lucrative, and family
lawyers as some type of bottom dweller.' Since the popularization of
Gary Becker's Treatise on the Family,3 a good deal of theoretical work
has been done.' Additionally, since the cleansing of the divorce reform
era, family lawyers have become a bit more respectable and more like
commercial lawyers. Most family law reform, however, has been singu-
larly uninformed by empirical studies,5 and many of the studies that do
exist present some intractable problems for social scientists.
1. Some of the sources that are the most analytical come from surprising fields. For example,
think of the Bible: the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:12, 20:14 and 20:17 all have obvious family
implications); the Proverbs injunctions not to "spare the rod" (Proverbs 29:15) and to honor "The
Good Wife" (Proverbs 31:10-31); the entire book of Hosea (portraying God as a faithful husband to
Israel's unfaithful wife); the parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32), and the Pauline family por-
trait (Ephesians 5:21-6:4). Before MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROP-
ERTY (1981), there were mostly nonlawyer observers: CATHARINE E. BEECHER, A TREATISE ON
DOMESTIC ECONOMY 1-46 (1841); ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, ch. XII
(Vintage Books 1945) (1831); HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Beacon Paperback 1963) (1861).
Lawyers making early stabs at theoretical family law include Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form,
41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941); Banks McDowell, Contracts in the Family, 45 B.U. L. REV. 43, 49
(1965); Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its
Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 198 (1939).
2. See generally Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Brinig, Mediation] (stating that mediation, which
does not require the hiring of an attorney, is an "inexpensive and time saving process for marriage dis-
solution").
3. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981). This was part of the work that won
Becker the Nobel prize and provides an analysis that fits the family of the 1950s well.
4. See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 159-61 (2000) [hereinafter BRINIG, CONTRACTS TO COVENANT]; MAR-
THA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990);
Brinig, Mediation, supra note 2; Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497 (1992); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Con-
tract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA.
L. REV. 2401 (1995).
5. MARGARET F. BRINIG ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN ACTION: A READER xxi-xxiii (1999). The
reader tries to fill the gap for law students. For an excellent attempt focusing on sampling and gener-
alizing problems and researcher bias, see Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science
Research in Family Law Analysis and Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
631 (1994). This observation does not mean that no good theoretical work has been done in family
law (including that of law professors). This should be obvious from the remainder of the discussion.
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Most of the law-and-economics work on families, including much of
my own,6 has used state cross-sectional data.' Though states arguably
have their own unique characteristics that make such studies defensible,8
there is enough variation within states (including the difference between,
say, northeastern Illinois and the Quincy area)9 that one longs for more
precise measures. There are good reasons, besides ignorance, why we
have used aggregates.
One problem plaguing family study but not other traditional areas
of law and economics is the confidentiality of some of the data, including
court materials. I° If you think about it, you will remember that matters
involving children" and especially adoption12 are highly sensitive. Court
However, some of the policy reaction to it has come only recently. For example, Elizabeth Scott &
Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1984), may have provided the em-
pirical basis for Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV.
615 (1992). In turn, the replication principle she argues for in the Pluralism piece has become the de-
fault rule (the rule for when parents do not themselves come to an agreement) under the AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.09 (2000).
6. Margaret F. Brinig, Finite Horizons: The American Family, 2 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 293 (1994)
[hereinafter Brinig, Finite Horizons]; Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and
Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998) [hereinafter Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody]; Margaret
F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL. STUDS. 201 (1996) [hereinafter
Brinig & Buckley, Deadbeats]; Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J. LEGAL STUDS. 869 (1994); Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At Fault Peo-
ple, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 325 (1998) [hereinafter Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault]; Margaret F. Brinig
& F.H. Buckley, The Price of Virtue, 98 PUB. CHOICE 111 (1999); Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley,
Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 SuP. Cr. ECON. REV. 141 (1997).
7. With cross-sectional analysis, a number or rate for each state becomes the dependent vari-
able. A separate observation may be made for each year in a series of years.
8. For example, there may be differences in population density, unwed births, and minority
population. See Oregon State University, Government Information Sharing Project, available at
http://sasquatch.kerr.orst.edu/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review).
9. For example, there may be differences in population density, per capita income, and poverty
level. General Cook County information is stored at http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/usaco-
list98?01-031.ilc (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). Gen-
eral Pulaski County, Illinois, information is stored at http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/usaco-
list98?01-153.ilc (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). Spe-
cific topics that might be of interest to family law researchers include Population, Total and Selected
Characteristics (revealing vast differences in population density), and Vital Statistics (tremendous
variation in the infant mortality rate, the birth rate, and the divorce rate).
10. Divorce cases may be sealed if a party so requests. Cases where there is an allegation of
criminal behavior (such as spousal violence or income tax fraud) may be sealed for years until the
criminal matter is disposed of. For a few examples, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (voluntary
commitment of a minor); J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975) (drug case involving question of
consent for search of foster child's room).
11. See, e.g., In re A.M., 766 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2001) (right to counsel at any stage of a delinquency
proceeding); In re C.L.M., 766 A.2d 992 (D.C. 2001) (disposition order in delinquency determination).
Some states routinely use initials for other cases that might prove embarrassing. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe,
747 A.2d 617 (Md. App. 2000) (intentional infliction of emotional distress filed by husband "resulting
from wife's alleged adultery and misrepresentation of paternity of children born during the mar-
riage."); In re Alyne E., 448 N.Y.S.2d 984 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (neglect of child's medical care a factor
in finding child abuse); J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978) (divorce custody).
12. For just a few examples, see Doe v. Kirchner, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995) (issue of consent to adop-
tion); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (establishment of paternity of child born of adul-
terous relationship); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to first trimester abortion); In re
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orders may be necessary before files can be released. 3 Alternatively,
state level data can be screened by the appropriate agency and identify-
ing information can be eliminated. This can prove to be expensive, slow,
and patience-consuming. 4 Another facet of family study that distin-
guishes it from other areas (and makes family law either fascinating or
discouraging for students) is its complexity. Not only do rules differ in
every state15 and practices differ between ethnic groups, 6 but family be-
havior is complicated by feelings. In economic terms, this means that the
usual types of "revealed behavior"'7 do not always explain much; in so-
cial science lingo, this translates into smaller R-squareds 18 than we would
like. Relational contracts 9 and crimes of passion2" may work the same
way. In family studies, a big role for emotions constitutes the rule rather
than the exception.
C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (nonparent custody); In re J.C., 417 So. 2d 529 (Miss.
1982) (revocation of consent for adoption); In re Baby M,.537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (revocation of
consent by surrogate); In re Adoption of a Child by T.W.C., 636 A.2d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994); In re Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (two conflicting petitions for adoption);
Gregory B. v. Gregory F., 542 N.E.2d 1052 (N.Y. 1989) (termination of parental rights of incarcerated
father).
13. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 238.24 (2000); VA. CODE § 63.1-219.53 (2000).
14. When developing data for Brinig & Crafton, supra note 6, I contacted each state's family
violence registry, inquiring about the number of crisis calls and shelter days during the last reported
year. When states did not provide the information quickly, I followed up with letters and phone calls.
After several such reminders and the passage of three months, one state, South Carolina, said they
would send me the data I needed. I received a letter from them that, in essence, reported that there
was an instance of domestic violence in the state every thirty seconds. Multiplied out and divided by
population, that translated into a rate about ten times higher than the highest actual count. See id. at
tbl.3 (where I finally approximated from shelter visits).
15. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Century
Ends with Unresolved Issues, 33 FAM. L.Q. 865, 908 (2000) (charts).
16. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OUT-OF-
WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING, 1995, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/wedlock.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). Pay particular attention to Table
11-5, Ratios of Birth to Unmarried Women by Race: United States and Each State, 1970, 1980, and
1985-93. Id. For divorce, see Joan Huber & Glenna Spitze, Considering Divorce: An Expansion of
Becker's Theory of Marital Instability, 86 AM. J. Soc. 75 (1980). For marriage, see Michael J. Brien et
al., Interrelated Family-Building Behaviors: Cohabitation, Marriage and Non-Marital Conception, 36
DEMOGRAPHY 535 (1999); Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Why Marry? Race and Transition
to Marriage Among Cohabitors, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 509 (1995). For differences based on religion, see
Teresa Castro Martin & Larry L. Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital Disruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 37
(1989); George Gallup, Jr. & Jim Castelli, Attitudes on Marriage Surveyed, Catholic, Protestant Divorce
Rates Similar, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1989, at C13.
17. See, e.g., DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 51-53 (2d ed. 1985);
HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 141-43 (2d ed. 1984). Economists explain that we can-
not observe people's preferences directly, but must observe instead their "revealed preferences," or, in
other words, see what they want by what they choose to do.
18. The R2 tests the goodness of fit of an equation to the data. Alan 0. Sykes, An Introduction
to Regression Analysis, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 19 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) ("Hence, the R2 sta-
tistic is a measure of the extent to which the total variation of the dependent variable is explained by
the regression.").
19. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 68-84 (1985) (governance of contractual relations); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1149 (1981).
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 204-11 (1992) (efficacy of criminal law in field of
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One example taken from my own recent work with sociologist Ste-
ven Nock2 may illustrate this point. Nock and I were trying to relate
marital stability or lack thereof to the way couples divided up their
household and labor force tasks.22 Our (or at least my) first instinct was
that marriages in which husbands shared housework with their working
spouses would be more stable than those in which the wives not only
worked but also maintained things at home.' The first interesting result
21. Steven Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce and the Divi-
sion of Labor, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Robert Rowthorn & An-
tony W. Dnes eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Nock & Brinig, Division of
Labor].
22. Married women who do not work outside the home have the poorest mental health of any
group of normal adults. Lois M. Verbrugge & Jennifer H. Madans, Women's Roles and Health, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1985, at 36; see also Margaret F. Brinig, The Law and Economics of No-Fault
Divorce-A Review of No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 453, 466-67 & n.87 (1993)
(efficiency in the distribution of household and labor force work must include psychic costs). But cf.
Suzanne M. Bianchi & Daphne Spain, Women, Work, and Family in America, 51 POPULATION BULL.
2 (1996); Shelley Coverman & Joseph Sheley, Change in Men's Housework and Child-Care Time,
1965-75, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 413, 420 (1986); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32
DEMOGRAPHY 483, 499 (1995) (physical health benefits for women as well as men); Richard Morin &
Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat; Poll Shows Sexes Agree on Pros and Cons of New
Roles, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al. Women are apparently both more committed and more
dependent than are men. W. Keith Bryant, The Family and Technology, 20 HUM. ECOLOGY F. 11
(1992); Steven L. Nock, Commitment and Dependency in Marriage, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 503
(1995); Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421 (1992);
Cathleen D. Zick & Jennifer Geurer, Family Compensation and Investment in Household Capital:
Contrasts in the Behavior of Husband-Wife and Female-Headed Households, 21 J. CONSUMER AFF. 21
(1987); Cathleen D. Zick & Jennifer Geurer, Trends in Married Couples' Time Use: Evidence from
1977-78 and 1987-88, 24 SEX ROLES 459 (1991). Employers prefer married men to single men. See,
e.g., Yinon Cohen & Yitchak Haberfeld, Why Do Married Men Earn More than Unmarried Men?, 20
SOC. SCI. RES. 29 (1991); Donna K. Ginther & Mateline Zavodny, Is the Male Marriage Premium Due
to Selection?: The Effect of Shotgun Weddings or the Return to Marriage, 14 J. POPULATION ECON. 313
(2001).
23. Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women's Economic Independence and the Probability
of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 906 (2000). Sayer and Bianchi are trying
to disprove the common supposition that women's increased employment (and economic power) de-
stabilizes marriage. They found, using the NSFH, that "indicators of marital commitment and satisfac-
tion are better predictors of marital dissolution than are measures of economic independence." Id. at
938. Sayer and Bianchi's piece, supra, found that if the husband felt the marriage troubled or un-
happy, it was not a statistically significant predictor of divorce within the next five years. If the wife
felt the marriage troubled or unhappy, there was a statistically significant relationship (holding other
things constant) at least to p < .01 and in one model to p < .001. Id. at 929-31 & tbl.3.
Erica Jong said, "We long for men to share these tasks with us equally, but not only do they not
want to, but we probably do not want to relinquish them. We are as attached to our children as ever.
Liberation has not severed the umbilical cord-nor would we want it to." VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 71 (1988); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Equality and Sharing: Views
of Household Across the Iron Curtain, 7 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 55 (1998); Robert J. Sampson et al., Be-
yond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. Soc. REv. 633
(1999).
Quarrels over housework can lead to divorce. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERI-
CAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 144-89 (1983). The conflict apparently is on a systemic level.
FRANCES K. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAMILIES: NO FAMILIES? THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 202-03 (1991):
Why can we not return to the old balance of men's and women's work and family roles, which
were "fair" to each in terms of hours, and which provided children with mothers who cared for
them intensively and fathers who supported them adequately? ... The major problem for women
posed by "old families" is demographic. With the increase in life expectance and the decline in
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was that it turned out that the type of housework mattered. 4 Holding
other factors constant, we found that if either spouse did additional hours
of traditional "women's work," the marriage was less stable.2 1 Con-
versely, if either spouse did traditional "men's work," the marriage was
more stable. 26 These results support some interesting economic conclu-
sions. 7 If you asked the spouses how they felt about the fairness of the
fertility, homemaking is no longer a lifetime career for women as a group. Either there has to be
a division within their adult lives, with about half their time devoted to raising two or so children
to adulthood and half spent in other occupations, or women have to be divided into mothers and
workers, or "real" workers and "mommy track" workers.
Id.
24. We relied on earlier studies (for example, SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER
FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS (1985)) to make this deter-
mination, though there was little question about the gendered nature of household labor. To verify
our allocation scheme, we contrasted male and female commitments to each task with paired t-tests.
All were statistically significant, and most showed large differences. Women's work was defined, ac-
cording to Table 1, as Preparing Meals, Washing Dishes, Cleaning House, Shopping, Washing and
Ironing, Paying Bills, and Driving Other Household Members. See infra Appendix tbl.1.
Each spouse was asked to complete a page with the following questions:
The questions on this page concern household tasks and who in your household normally spends
time doing those tasks. Write in the approximate number of hours per week that you, your
spouse/partner or others in the household normally spend doing the following things:
1) Preparing Meals
2) Washing Dishes and Cleaning Up After Meals
3) Cleaning House
4) Outdoor and Other Household Maintenance Tasks
5) Shopping for Groceries and Other Household Goods
6) Washing, Ironing, Mending
7) Paying Bills and Keeping Financial Records
8) Automobile Maintenance and Repair
9) Driving Other Household Members to Work, School, or Other Activities
25. We held constant the following: (1) age at first marriage for husband, (2) age at first marriage
for wife, (3) the couple cohabited (with each other) before marriage, (4) number of children born to
the couple, (5) husband's wage/salary income last year, (6) wife's wage/salary income last year, (7) race
(of husbands, and whether the wife is the same race), (8) husband's years of schooling, (9) wife's years
of schooling, (10) husband's parents are divorced, and (11) wife's parents are divorced. These factors
were chosen because each had been found in prior studies to significantly affect marital stability. We
also included the hours worked in the paid labor force for both husbands and wives.
We used the National Survey of Families and Households, Waves 1 and 2, and considered those
couples in first marriages at the time of Wave 1. Of the 4,273 couples who met our criteria for inclu-
sion in the first wave, unambiguous information about the subsequent status of their marriage was
available for 3,592. Of these, 275 (6.3%) divorced and another 105 (2.9%) separated (where one
spouse permanently moved out of the dwelling) in the course of the study. We treat divorce or separa-
tion as marital disruptions and our equations combine the two. See infra Appendix tbl.2.
26. Men's work was defined as Outdoor Tasks and Auto Maintenance. See infra Appendix tbll.
27. What might explain the difference in the impact of "men's" and "women's" work? Tradi-
tionally male jobs, when done outside the household, are higher paying than are traditionally female
jobs, and tend to be (psychologically) valued more. Particularly for the middle-class couples at the
mean of our sample, who together were earning roughly $40,000 a year in 1987-88, doing such work
for the household may not seem degrading (and may actually seem rewarding). For example, the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics reports weekly earnings of $444 for carpentry and floor work, $385 for plumb-
ing and heating, and $332 for auto repair. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 438 tbl.698 (1998). However, for either spouse (and particularly men), doing the
lower-paying, lower-status "female" work apparently lowers the value of the marriage. See infra Ap-
pendix tbl.2. The same Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows weekly earnings of $210 for residential
care, $146 for miscellaneous personal services, $206 for laundry-dry cleaning and garment services, and
$159 for retail bakeries. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra at 438, tbl.698. In 1985, men employed as re-
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situation,' however, not only did the R' improve dramatically,29 but the
waters generally muddied. If the spouse felt that the household labor
situation was unfair to the other, the marriage was more stable (particu-
larly if the man felt it was unfair to the woman, and she agreed).3"
Finally, it seems that the woman's feelings about the relationship
are more important than the man's.3 ' If the man feels the relationship is
emotionally bankrupt, he will not file for divorce.32 If the woman feels
the same (in the same relationship), she will file.33 So there may be gen-
der differences in matters involving families that would not show up in
other areas of law.34 At the same time, my research with Doug Allen
shows that sometimes the obvious characteristics are not important.35
For example, those showing economic power in a relationship36 deter-
mine who will file for divorce only in a small percentage of cases, and
pairers and mechanics earned an average of $400 weekly, compared to the $130 women earned in pri-
vate household service.
There are other, and related, explanations for the difference between the effects of "men's" and
"women's" work on marital stability. "Men's work" tends to contribute directly to the value of the
couples' tangible assets. For example, building an addition on a house or installing thermally efficient
windows will increase the home's resale value. It will also increase the share of the property allocated
to whoever did or financed the improvement. Doing work on an automobile may save costly repairs
and may increase the car's resale or trade-in value. On the other hand, ironing shirts or keeping a
spotless home enhances assets in a much less direct and tangible way.
28. Spouses were asked the following question:
How do you feel about the fairness in your relationship in each of the following areas?
1) Household chores
2) Working for pay
Possible answers were: 1 = Very unfair to me, 2 = Somewhat unfair to me, 3 = Fair to Both, 4 =
Somewhat unfair to him/her, and 5 = Very unfair to him/her. See infra Appendix tbl.3.
29. Id. We were using a Cox proportional hazards model (the change in the chance the marriage
would survive until the next month), so the correct statistic to report is the Change in the -2LL. See
infra Appendix tbl.2.
TABLE5
Known Fac- Hours of House- Sense of Fair- Sense of Fair-
tors hold and Labor ness ness*Hours In-
Force Work teraction
Change (-2LL) 443.766** 44.070** 20.076** 24.066**
30. See infra Appendix tbl.3.
31. Sayer & Bianchi, supra note 23, at 938.
32. Id. at 929 tbl.3. Sayer and Bianchi's piece found that if the husband felt the marriage trou-
bled or unhappy, it was not a statistically significant predictor of divorce within the next five years. Id.
See generally STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN's LIVES (1999) (discussing the importance of the
relationship of masculinity to marriage for men).
33. If the wife felt the marriage either troubled or unhappy, there was a statistically significant
relationship (holding other things constant) at least to p < .01 and in one model to p < .001. Sayer &
Bianchi, supra note 23, at 929-31 & tbl.3.
34. See generally Margaret F. Brinig, Mediation, supra note 2.
35. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": Why Most
Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000).
36. In our study, these human capital factors (reported on divorce certificates) included length of
marriage, age of wife at marriage, education of each spouse, number of minor children, number of
prior divorces for each spouse, and some interaction terms.
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fault plays a relatively small observable role.37 Additionally, unexpected
legal or sociological factors are also important. In our case, who got cus-
tody of the kids swamped all the other factors.38
Sometimes, we get valuable family law information from nonreport-
ing. Another group for whom stable marriages were found in the Nock
and Brinig study involved those who did not report on the household di-
vision of labor.39 This "lack of reporting equals success" problem will be
true of antenuptial agreements as well, since they are not filed unless the
marriage falls apart later.4°
Finally, there is a good deal of possibly significant data that no one
collects. For example, Louisiana has never reported marriage and di-
vorce data41 (and Indiana reports it only sporadically).42 Where there is
no baseline, it is very difficult to measure the relative success of "natural
experiments" like the Louisiana (and Arizona) covenant marriage legis-
lation.43 While policy makers may be able to "write off" Louisiana as an
atypical state,' since 1995, states are no longer required to report de-
tailed divorce data because the National Center for Vital Statistics has
37. Brinig & Allen, supra note 35, report that in Virginia, divorce was granted on the fault
grounds of cruelty (the most common) only about six percent of the time.
38. Id. at 158 ("We have found that who gets the children is by far the most important compo-
nent in deciding who files for divorce, particularly when there is little quarrel about property, as when
the separation is long."). Brinig and Allen argue for the American Law Institute's "replication princi-
ple," which if the parties cannot agree grants custody in proportion to the time each spent on child-
rearing tasks before their separation. Id. at 158-60; see infra Appendix tbl.4.
39. As Nock and Brinig argue, a good marriage does not exist in the present (in the exchange
relationship that certainly characterizes a commercial market and probably spouses thinking about
divorce), but in the past (thinking over shared good times) and the future (hoping and planning for the
day in which things will be easier). Nock & Brinig, supra note 21, at 187. We either do not expect an
immediate payback, thinking things will eventually even out, or we simply act "out of love." See also
Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 Soc. Sci. RES. 235, 239-41 (1999) (Certain be-
havior in marriage only makes sense if its turn-taking nature is considered; marriages exist not only in
the present, but more vividly in their "histories and futures").
40. They are apparently growing in popularity, however, at least according to divorce attorneys.
See, e.g., Mary Bridgman, Sealed with a ... Prenuptial; Planning for 'Equitable' Divorce Can Be Tu-
multuous, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1995, at G1.
41. See, e.g., NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS SYS., PROVISIONAL TABLE ON MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES BY STATE, 1999, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/48_19_3.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2001) (does not include Louisiana for divorces).
42. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, PROVISIONAL TABLES ON MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES, NOVEMBER 1996-98 tbl.3, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/unpubd/
nvsrtabl.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (does not include Indiana or Louisiana for divorces).
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9, § 102 (West 2001);
see, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Economics, Law, and Covenant Marriage, 16 GENDER ISSUES 4 (1998).
For another type of "experiment," see Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.
Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with
the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1990).
44. Louisiana is distinguished by its civil tradition and decentralized state government (where
much information is kept by individual parishes). It has nearly three times the national African-
American population (30.63% as opposed to 11.77%), and nearly twice as many people in poverty
(22.91% as opposed to 12.76%). U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT DATA BOOK PROFILES, 1989-90, available at http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/sddb-
list?state=la&report=default&dl=Louisiana (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of
Illinois Law Review).
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eliminated that data collection project.45 This means that any work done
with state cross-sectional data (the most frequently used thus far) cannot
accurately use more recent data. Since marriage and divorce reform in
various guises is before virtually every state legislature, 46 important deci-
sions that will affect many, if not most Americans, will be made based on
outdated (at best) statistical evidence.
The other (and arguably better) empirical methodology that could
be used, panel data,47 is very costly. Again there are two problems re-
lated to the type of information being collected: (1) time series studies
should be long and (2) families are very complicated. For example, say
one wanted to calculate the effects (cost or otherwise) of divorce on chil-
dren. Recent work by Wallerstein 48 and Booth and D'Amato49 suggests
that some major divorce effects may not be felt for many years and may
be transmitted intergenerationallyi ° This would be true, according to
Garfinkel and McLanahan, of the effects of unmarried parenting or pov-
erty as well." Likewise, one set of arguments against same-sex marriage
45. See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CHANGE IN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE DATA, 60
Fed. Reg. 64, 437 (Dec. 15, 1995), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/datasite/
frnotice.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
46. For a well-maintained list of articles about divorce reform, see John Crouch, Divorce Reform
Page, available at http://patriot.net/-crouch/divorce.html#anchor2l907205 (last visited Oct. 30,2001).
47. For a panel study, data is collected on the individual level. For most social science studies,
this consists of surveys (as with census data or the National Survey of Families and Households).
Panel studies can also be done using information provided on legal documents such as divorce certifi-
cates, see Brinig & Allen, supra note 35, at 139; or tax forms, see Ross Finnie, Women, Men, and the
Economic Consequences of Divorce: Evidence from Canadian Longitudinal Data, 30 CANADIAN REV.
SOC. & ANTHRO. 205,206 (1993).
48. The latest, JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25
YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000) [hereinafter WALLERSTEIN, UNEXPECTED LEGACY], was criticized
by Walter Kim, Should You Stay Together for the Kids?, TIME, Sept. 25, 2000, at 74. Earlier work
includes JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) [hereinafter WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES]; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) [hereinafter WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP]; Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 349 (1991) [hereinafter Wallerstein, Long-Term Effects];
Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, The Father-Child Relationship: Changes After Divorce, in
FATHER AND CHILD: DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES (S. Cath et al. eds., 1st ed.
1982).
49. PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF
FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997).
50. See, e.g., id. at 109-10 (citing a number of studies including some of their own); WALLER-
STEIN, UNEXPECTED LEGACY, supra note 48, at xxix ("[T]he major impact of divorce does not occur
during childhood or adolescence[, riather it rises in adulthood as serious romantic relationships move
center stage.").
51. - See, e.g., SARA S. MCLANAHAN & IRWIN GARFINKEL, SINGLE MOTHERS, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1989) [hereinafter MCLANAHAN & GARFINKEL, SINGLE MOTHERS]; see also
Chong-Bum An et al., Teen Out-of-Wedlock Births and Welfare Receipt: The Role of Childhood Events
and Economic Circumstances, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 195 (1993); Peter Gottschalk, AFDC Participa-
tion Across Generations, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 367 (1990); Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S.
Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1992).
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revolves around the effect of same-sex parenting on children.5 2 Immedi-
ate effects, while interesting, are not really the concern. 3 What decision
makers want to know is the difference, if any, of such family environ-
ments on children as they reach adulthood, develop their own sexual re-
lationships, and parent. 4
Then, establishing control groups can be problematic." Returning
to the costs of divorce problem, we might notice that common traits of
families with parents who are divorced are not typical in families with
parents who are not divorced.56 They may well have more illness,57 more
counseling,58 and more financial problems59 before the parents separate.
Critics of the final project will appropriately object to the study of only
families who undergo counseling,' file divorce petitions, or report vio-
lence. A retrospective report by divorcing families will be skewed in part
by the emotions of the moment or the desire to self-vindicate.61 (A sub-
stantial debate surrounded the cause and effect problems of relationship
52. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science,
and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253; Lynn D. Wardle, Fighting with Phantoms: A
Reply to Warring with Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 629.
53. They are not a concern because these children tend to do at least as well with general psy-
chological adjustment and grades as do other children. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian
and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1033 (1992) ("[C]oncerns about difficulties in personal devel-
opment among children of gay and lesbian parents are not sustained by results of existing research.").
54. See, e.g., FIONA TASKER & SUSAN GOLOMBOK, GROWING UP IN A LESBIAN FAMILY 37-49
(1997); Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation of Their Chil-
dren? Findings From a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32 DEVELOPMNTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 3-5
(1996) (twenty-seven lesbian families). For a longitudinal study that began in 1986, see Nanette Gar-
trell et al., The National Lesbian Family Study: 1. Interviews with Prospective Mothers, 66 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 272, 273-78 (1996) (eighty-four lesbian families).
55. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 53, at 1026 (discussing problems of control groups). For an
example of a study that presents such a problem, see Golombok & Tasker, supra note 54, at 5-7 (chil-
dren of lesbian couples compared with children of single heterosexual mothers without male living in
the home).
56. In order to eliminate such problems, a cost of divorce study is currently being contemplated
that will control for such problems by looking only at divorcing families and comparing their expenses
prior to and following divorce. The written reports will note the problem. Steven L. Nock & Marga-
ret F. Brinig, Principal Investigator, Measuring the Economic Facts of the Breakdown of Marriage,
Department of Justice (for more information, contact author).
57. Erik Bendvold et aL, Marital Break-Up Among Couples Raising Families by Artificial In-
semination by Donor, 51 FERTILITY & STERILITY 980, 982 (1989); Laura Betzig, Causes of Conjugal
Dissolution: A Cross-Cultural Study, 30 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 654, 667-69 (1989); Margaret F.
Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Child Abuse and the Ugly Duckling, 1 J. FAM. STUDS. 41 (1999) [hereinafter
Brinig & Buckley, Ugly Duckling]. These authors suggest that other studies exaggerated the high
separation rate of infertile couples because they did not compare separation rates to populations that
were demographically similar. M.T. Hearn et al., Psychological Characteristics of in Vitro Fertilization
Participants, 156 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 269, 273 (1987). This piece discusses the
stresses on families that experience some type of medical problem or disability.
58. Such counseling is being considered by a number of other states. See Americans for Divorce
Reform, Marriage Education and Skills Training Legislation, at http://www.divorcereform.org/coun.
html (last visited Nov. 15,2001).
59. Gary S. Becker et al., An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141,
1160 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Kirn, supra note 48, at 74 (criticizing Wallerstein).
61. For a discussion of the need to do so, see Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce
Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 99-102.
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instability and cohabitation.6" Did people self-select into nonmarital rela-
tionships because they had different values from those that moved di-
rectly into marriage?63 Were they different socioeconomically, so that it
was not the nature of the relationship but something else that caused the
greater instability?)' Some of these problems are cured by very large,
very expensive, virtually unassailable studies like the NSFH,65 the PSID,6
or the NLSY.67 But these projects are such vast undertakings that the so-
cial scientists who generate them eventually run out of steam.'
62. For a sampling, see Robert J. Willis & Robert T. Michael, Innovation in Family Formation:
Evidence on Cohabitation in the United States, in THE FAMILY, THE MARKET AND THE STATE IN AG-
ING SOCIETIES 9 (John Ermish & Naohiro Ogawa eds., 1994); Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet,
National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 615, 615 (1989) [hereinafter Bumpass & Sweet,
National Estimates] ("There is no single answer to whether cohabitation is a late stage of courtship or
an early stage of marriage. It is the former for couples who are uncertain about their relationship but
are considering marriage, the latter for those who would marry immediately were it not for some
practical constraint, and neither for couples who do not want to marry each other."); Larry L.
Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913
(1991); Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES
53 (1995).
63. Bumpass & Sweet, National Estimates, supra note 62, at 621-24; William G. Axinn & Arland
Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation and Divorce: Selectivity or Causal Influence?, 29
DEMOGRAPHY 357, 358 (1992); Alfred DeMaris & William McDonald, Premarital Cohabitation and
Marital Instability: A Test of the Unconventionality Hypothesis, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 399 (1993).
64. See, e.g., Marin Clarkberg, The Price of Partnering: The Role of Economic Well-Being in
Young Adults' First Union Experiences, 77 Soc. FORCES 945 (1999) (including a substantial bibliogra-
phy); Oystein Kravdal, Does Marriage Require a Stronger Economic Underpinning Than Informal Co-
habitation?, 53 POPULATION STUD. 63 (1999); Zeng Wu & Michael S. Pollard, Economic Circum-
stances and the Stability of Nonmarital Cohabitation, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 303 (2000).
65. National Survey of Families and Households, which was first administered in 1987-88 and
included personal "interviews with 13,007 respondents from a national sample," most of whom were
reinterviewed in 1992-93.
The sample includes a main cross-section of 9,637 households plus an oversampling of blacks,
Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, single-parent families, families with step-children, cohabiting
couples and recently married persons. One adult per household was randomly selected as the
primary respondent. Several portions of the main interview were self-administered to facilitate
the collection of sensitive information and to ease the flow of the interview.
The NSFH was administered by the Center for Demography and Ecology of the University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison. JAMES A. SWEET & LARRY L. BUMPASS, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS-
WAVES 1 AND 2: DATA DESCRIPTION AND DOCUMENTATION, available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/
home.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2001).
66. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of US individuals and the families in which
they reside. It has been ongoing since 1968. The data were collected annually through 1997, and
biennially starting in 1999. The data files contain the full span of information collected over the
course of the study. PSID data can be used for cross-sectional, longitudinal, and intergenera-
tional analysis and for studying both individuals and families.
The PSID is part of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, available at http://www.
isr.umich.edu/src/psid/index.htmi (last visited Nov. 12,2001).
67. The [National Longitudinal Survey of Youth] (NLSY79) is a nationally representative sample
of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979.
These individuals are now in their thirties to early forties, and have been interviewed for almost two
decades. Since their first interview, many of the respondents have made both the transitions from
school to work, and from their parent's home to becoming parents and homeowners. Data collected
yearly chronicle these changes and provide researchers an opportunity to study in great detail the ex-
periences of a large group of young adults who can be considered representative of all American men
and women born in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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To my mind, anyway, lack of confidence in the unbiased nature of
the principal investigators involved in the smaller scale studies presents
grave difficulties.69 Sometimes the best, and least assailable, work is done
by people who cannot claim to speak in the "voice" of the persons most
affected.7" Here I would place McLanahan and Garfinkel's sociological
work on poverty7 and the psychological studies of Mavis Hetherington's
team at the University of Virginia72 dealing with the effects of various
family forms on children. Since these panel study projects are so large73
and time consuming (and writing grant proposals is not one of most re-
searchers' favorite ways to spend time), many influential studies come
from those with personal stakes in the outcome. In fact most of the re-
search on same-sex relationships, for example, comes from people who
are in same-sex relationships.74 Some of the work on the effects of no-
fault divorce came from proponents of the movement75 or those who
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GENERAL OVERVIEW OF NLSY79, available
at http://stats.bls.gov/nlshome.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001).
68. For example, the first two waves of NSFH interviews were conducted in 1987-88 and 1992-
93. SWEET & BUMPASS, supra note 65. A third wave of data collection is ongoing at present.
69. See, e.g., Ramsey & Kelley, supra note 5, at 655-70; Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of
Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 848 (claiming researcher bias). Again,
let me reiterate that I am not referring to the larger studies just discussed.
70. See, e.g., EVLYN REED, SEXISM AND SCIENCE (1978); Barbara DuBois, Passionate Scholar-
ship: Notes on Values, Knowing and Method in Feminist Social Science, in THEORIES OF WOMEN'S
STUDIES 105 (Gloria Bowles & Renate D. Klein eds., 1983); Nancy S. Dye, Clio's American Daugh-
ters: Male History, Female Reality, in THE PRISM OF SEX: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
922 (Julia A. Sherman & Evelyn T. Beck eds., 1979); John L. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000);
Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody
Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985). Outside the
legal arena, see Lynnell Burkett, Diversity Seeks More Than One Voice, THE MASTHEAD, Winter
1993, at 28; Teresa Zackodnik, "I Am Blackening in My Way:" Identity and Place in Dionne Brand's
No Language Is Neutral, ESSAYS ON CANADIAN WRITING, Winter 1995, at 194.
71. See generally SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PAR-
ENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); MCLANAHAN & GARFINKEL, SINGLE MOTHERS, supra note
51.
72. E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADI-
TIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982) [herein-
after Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce]; E. Mavis Hetherington, Effects of Father Absence on
Personality Development, 7 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 313, 316 (1972); E. Mavis Hetherington et al.,
Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage on the Adjustment of Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 518 (1985) [hereinafter Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects].
73. They have to be, to avoid small sample size problems. See Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 5, at
641-47. For a case law example, see Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Va. 1978) ("The
Court concludes that the numbers involved are too small to allow a finding of disparate impact under
the Griggs rule.... The number of different individuals who were applicants in 1973 and 1975 is only
ten-four black and six white.").
74. See Wardle, supra note 69, at 848; Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 5, at 662-63 (discussing the
claims that research on women needs to be "done by, on, and for women").
75. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and
Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719 (lead author's comprehensive The
Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989), depended heavily on concept of no-fault; he was Chief
Reporter for the ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2001)); Fineman & Opie,
supra note 70 (involved with Wisconsin divorce reform); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's
No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 313 (1987) (involved with California divorce reform and
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took advantage of the new laws themselves,76 and much of the smaller
scale research on the effects of third party day care77 or the effect of fa-
ther custody78 seems to be of the same ilk. The balance between "voice"
and bias, then, is both critical and hard to maintain.
Another problem related to control groups is that while some
studies may be absolutely valid for their time and place, they may not be
generalizable (or replicable) over other populations. Policymakers may
be under great pressure to act immediately when the more prudent
course would be to wait for more than pilot programs. An example of
this problem comes from the work on family violence reported by
Lawrence Sherman and others based on a very well-conceived study
done in Minneapolis.79 Sherman's early work showed that the mandatory
arrest of domestic abusers resulted in a lower rate of recidivism than did
more traditional approaches to domestic abuse' complaints made to law
enforcement officers." Based on Sherman's study, the single most
frequent reform these days is mandatory arrest.82 The problem is that
when money and court permission were obtained to replicate the study
in six other cities, the results were quite different and in some cases
completely opposite.83 As Sherman himself reported, the original
conclusion works in homogeneous populations and in those where the
bulk of the offenders are employed (i.e., have reputations to maintain).'
When the domestic abuse offender has less stake in community or
employer reputation, mandatory arrest may cause more rather than less
UMDA, not empirical but theoretical); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating
Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 498 (1984) (authors were advocates
for mandatory mediation in Colorado).
76. See discussion of divorce reform in ALLEN PARKMAN, WHAT'S AT FAULT WITH NO-FAULT
(1992).
77. John O'Neil, Toilet Training Without Any Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at F6.
7& See Robert A. Frank, Is the Male in Child Care Role Changing? Primary Caregiving Males
Demonstrate the Changing Family Structure: Implication for Social Work Practice, available at
http://slowlane.com/research/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) (The Online Resource for Stay at
Home Dads).
79. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Do-
mestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).
80. Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The Min-
neapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 117 (1989).
81. More traditional responses might be separation of the spouses for a cooling off period, a lec-
ture by the police officer, or the issuance of a restraining order. See BRINIG ET AL., supra note 5, at
228-47.
82. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrests of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in DO ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 141-45 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996)
(criticizing arguments that mandatory arrest policies "disempower" battered women); Dennis P.
Saccuzzo, How Should the Police Respond to Domestic Violence: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis
of Mandatory Arrest, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765 (1999); Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest:
A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533. For
statutory examples, see IOWA CODE §§ 236.12, 708.2A, 907.3 (1996).
83. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Infor-
mal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 680 (1992).
84. See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The
Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,139 (1992).
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recidivism." The follow-up studies have been largely ignored,
apparently, by state legislatures working on domestic violence laws. The
more pressing the problem, the less likely policymakers will be to wait
until they have enough evidence to make critical decisions. Another
example of trying to make policy changes based on single experiences
may be welfare reform. The success of Governor Thompson in
Wisconsin' has not been duplicated in all states under the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families Act.87
One question that law and economics proponents cheerfully assume
away,88 but that seems to be important in the family law area, is whether
people pay much attention to laws in the first place,89 and, particularly,
whether or not the law affects their behavior.' One frequently cited
study by Baker and Emery9' (fraught perhaps with some of the difficul-
ties of control group selection mentioned earlier)92 suggests that family
85. Lawrence Sherman, Should Police Officers Be Required to Arrest Abusive Husbands?, 8
HEALTH 32 (1994).
86. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 49.90(2) (1987). See generally Rogers Worthington, Wisconsin's Big
Cheese: Can Wisconsin Gov. Tommy Thompson Ride Welfare Reform into the White House?, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 10, 1994, at E8.
87. See, e.g., Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., ESX-L-10171-97 (2000); Michael W.
Lynch, The Hassle Factor: How Welfare Reform Looks in Camden, New Jersey, 32 REASON 18 (2000);
Randall J. Peach, Judge Upholds NJ's Welfare Cap Linked to Birth of Added Children, 161 N.J.L.J. 8
(2000) (discussing Sojourner).
88. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOM-
ICs 3 (1953), reprinted in ESSAYS IN MICROECONOMIcS 23, 33-34 (William Breit & Harold M.
Hochman eds., 2d ed. 1971) ("Consider the density of leaves around a tree. I suggest the hypothesis
that the leaves are positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it
receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws determining the amount of
sunlight that would be received in various positions and could move rapidly or instantaneously from
any one position to any other desired and unoccupied position.").
89. E-mail from Steven L. Nock, University of Virginia, Department of Sociology, to Margaret
F. Brinig, Professor of Law, University of Iowa (Apr. 12, 2000) (on file with University of Illinois Law
Review). "He uses a demographic concept (Exposure to Risk), but demographers would insist that
the risk actually exist (as in disease). If a person doesn't know about the law until s/he approaches a
lawyer, the exposure to unilateral divorce or not [sic] probably makes no difference." Id.
90. Only about forty percent of the people in Louisiana surveyed had ever heard of covenant
marriage. E-mail from Steven L. Nock, University of Virginia, Department of Sociology, to Margaret
F. Brinig, Professor of Law, University of Iowa (Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with the University of Illinois
Law Review).
Further, when a graduate student and sociologist applied for a marriage license in one-fourth of all
Louisiana counties, they found that the "Not covenant marriage" box had been checked for them in
some instances, while in virtually none was the new law explained. In short, Nock explains, "Virtually
nobody hears about the option when they apply for a license. So the only people asking for covenant
marriages are those who heard about it in church." Id.
91. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993). Among the
sixty-five citations in Westlaw were Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091
(2000) (discussing the overconfidentiality bias found in Baker & Emery).
92. The people surveyed were largely white, middle-class people in Charlottesville, Virginia.
One group consisted of individuals who had recently applied for a marriage license and one consisted
of Baker's family law class. They were answering what they thought the law was and what they
thought would happen to them (for example, on divorce), but were not presented with immediate fam-
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law and the realities of divorce decisions are not important, either for the
general public or for those obtaining marriage licenses.93 Economists
who study "rational addiction"'94 may have no problems with "rational
love"'95 or "rational lust"'  or "rational violence."'97  Clearly law plays at
least an important, if not critical, role when people who are represented
by counsel make divorce settlements.98 Though I know this is not a posi-
tion I have taken in the past,99 I wonder now how important law is for the
decisions to marry, have children, or even divorce."° Some law and soci-
ety work done during the 1960s suggests that law plays a relatively minor
role compared to personal relationship and reputation, even in the com-
mercial (corporate) context.101 At the very least, this criticism suggests
caution and further study rather than cavalier assumptions that all our
behavior is made "in the shadow of law."'0 2 Thus, if we behave differ-
ently when one law is present rather than another, we must not assume
the behavior was shaped by the law rather than something else,0 3 such as
different or changing labor force behavior."
ily law problems of the sort that interested the authors. (The authors acknowledge these limitations in
their paper.) Baker & Emery, supra note 91, at 440,444-45.
93. Id. at 439.
94. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675
(1988); see Theodore B. Keeler et al., Rational Addiction and Smoking Cessation: An Empirical Study,
28 J. SocIo-ECON. 633 (1999).
95. BECKER, supra note 3, at 124.
96. POSNER, supra note 20, at 393-94 (optimal penalty for rape).
97. Brinig & Crafton, supra note 6, 869-70 (spouse abuse as response to illusory marriage con-
tract).
98. The most famous piece is Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). For other descriptions or empirical
work, see KENNETH KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: How PROFESSIONALS AND COUPLES NE-
GOTIATE SETrLEMENTS (Basic Books 1985); Brinig, Mediation, supra note 2; Margaret F. Brinig &
Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 279 (1993); Joan B. Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents' Percep-
tions of Their Processes and Outcomes, 24 MEDIATION Q. 71, 78 tbl.1 (1989).
99. Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6; Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody, supra note 6;
Brinig & Crafton, supra note 6.
100. Once a person actually contemplates divorce, the much lower transaction costs offered by
no-fault may make this set of laws relevant. See Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6. But see
Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Di-
vorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1994); Martin Zelder, The Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 241 (1993) [hereinafter Zelder, Eco-
nomic Analysis].
101. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963).
102. "In the Shadow of" titles in family law include Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 98; Brian
Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We
Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1998); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998).
103. Friedman, supra note 88; St6phane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the
American Family (2001) (mimeo, Northwestern University Department of Economics), at http://www.
chass.utoronto.ca/-mechoala/workingpa.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
104. Allen M. Parkman, Why Are Married Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
41 (1998). This is not the same as the Coasian bargaining argued for in H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage
and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986).
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We also make assumptions when we characterize law. When the
variable of interest is a law, especially when doing state cross-sectional
work, whether we see a divorce law as "bilateral""0 5 or "mutual con-
sent"" rather than "unilateral"1 7 or "fault"'1"8 or "no-fault"'" becomes
critical to the empirical tests that follow. The characterization unfortu-
nately is not simple. First, there is the problem of what should count.
Do we care if fault is retained in alimony or property when it has been
eliminated from divorce grounds?11° On the other hand, is fault relevant
if people can obtain fault divorces but fault is irrelevant in the financial
aspects of a divorce?"' Economists do not seem as bothered by such
questions as are attorneys, 1 2 particularly those who know that divorce
clients see entire settlements as packages1 3 and find particular symbols
(such as who was at fault in breaking up a marriage) extremely impor-
tant.114 Finally, (and of course this is not a problem restricted to family
law) written law may be quite different from the way judges implement it
in practice. If there is variation between jurisdictions all ostensibly fol-
lowing the same rules, we cannot really be sure what is going on. For ex-
ample, the rule in Virginia is that for a no-fault divorce, one must be
separated for a prescribed period (one year in most cases). 5 For some
judges, this required separate houses 6 (as it does for income tax pur-
poses)." 7 In other parts of the state and sometimes even in the same
county, however, as long as the couple's lives were separate, they could
live under the same roof."8 What does the law mean?
I turn now to an evaluation of which fields have been worked
enough and which need more research. One field to which I have con-
105. See generally Peters, supra note 104.
106. ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 137-40 (1992); accord
Peters, supra note 104, at 446.
107. This would mean that it was only necessary for one person to want a divorce; the other party
would have no way to prevent it. Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evi-
dence from Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (1998). In fact, this is the rule in all fifty states.
108. Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6, at 327-28; Ellman & Lohr, supra note 75, at 722-
23.
109. Since the late 1970s, all states have eliminated proof of fault for obtaining divorce. Ellman &
Lohr, supra note 75, at 722.
110. Compare Peters, supra note 104, with Friedberg, supra note 107.
111. Compare Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6, with Ellman & Lohr, supra note 75.
112. I once read a paper by two economists that attempted to model divorce bargaining as a two-
person game. This might have been plausible except that the only two things one could bargain over
were custody (fair enough) and child support (which is set by state guidelines so as not to be the sub-
ject of bargaining). Because they cannot include child support in their deals, spouses frequently in-
clude property distribution (who gets the house) or alimony.
113. Cf. Kelley v. Kelley, 248 Va. 295 (1994) (involving a property settlement agreement where
the wife kept all equity in the marital home in exchange for her waiver of any child support payments
by her former husband and father to her children).
114. Wardle, supra note 61, at 94-97.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Michie 2001).
116. See, e.g., Yane v. Yane, 8 Va. Cir. 336, 336-37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1987), available at 1986 WL
401751.
117. 26 C.F.R. 1.71-1(2) (2001).
118. Doggett v. Doggett, 5 Va. Cir. 349 (1986).
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tributed but which I think has been perhaps overstudied (pointing out
many of the problems I have discussed above about investigator bias,
construction of laws, and generalizability) is the effect of no-fault divorce
on divorce rates."9 In addition, this particular data is confounded by the
reality that many people move shortly before they divorce. 2 ° Thus, hold-
ing constant other demographic factors becomes very difficult if state
cross-sectional data is used, as it usually is.'
There also seems to be plenty of good work in at least the United
States and Canada on the financial effect of divorce on husbands,'22
wives, and children. 23  Some of the enthusiasm about answering this
question was no doubt triggered by one study 24 that is not replicable,'12
but that suggested very large effects: positive for men, and negative for
women and the children in their custody.'26 I think it is quite well settled
now that men do somewhat better financially than their former wives, at
least without taking into account tax consequences. 127  Both men and
119. Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6; Ellman & Lohr, supra note 75; Friedberg, supra
note 107; B.G. Gunter & Doyle P. Johnson, Divorce Filing as Role Behavior: Effect of No-Fault on
Divorce Filing Patterns, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 571 (1978); Thomas Marvell, Divorce Rates and the
Fault Requirement, 23 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 543 (1989); Paul A. Nakonezny et al., The Effect of
No-Fault Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education,
and Religiosity, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 477 (1995); Peters, supra note 104; Yoram Weiss & Robert
Willis, Transfers Among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 629 (1993);
Zelder, Economic Analysis, supra note 100.
120. See, e.g., Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6, at 332 n.25. Nevada is still a popular di-
vorce state even though no-fault is readily obtainable everywhere in the United States. From 1973-91,
Nevada's average annual divorce rate was 15.47 per 1000, about three times higher than the mean of
5.08 when Nevada was excluded. The next highest rate was approximately 8.
121. Exceptions include Friedberg, supra note 107; Allen Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the
Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women, Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671 (1992); Peters,
supra note 104. Mobility remains a problem in panel data because surveys and divorce petitions ask
where a person now lives, not where he or she lived before divorce. For a recent attempt to minimize
the problem, see Christopher J. Mazingo & John H. Johnson, The Impact of Divorce on Child Out-
comes: Evidence from Variation in Unilateral Divorce Laws (Department of Economics, University of
Illinois and MIT, 2000), available at http://www.cba.uiuc.edu/research/wp00papers.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2001).
122. SANFORD L. BRAVER & DIANE O'CONNELL, DIVORCED DADS: SHATTERING THE MYTHS
(2000) (with adjustments for taxation and shared parenting); NOCK, supra note 32.
123. See, e.g., Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right; Harmful Effects of Divorce on
Children, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 47 (review essay). For empirical work, see, e.g., WALLERSTEIN &
BLACKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES, supra note 48; Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody, supra note 6; Brinig
& Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6; Greg S. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the
Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485 (1985); Hetherington et al.,
Effects of Divorce, supra note 72; Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 72; Peters, supra
note 104; Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM.
SOC. REV. 528 (1996). Weitzman's rejoinder to Peterson is Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economic Con-
sequences of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment on Peterson, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 537 (1996).
124. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981).
125. See generally Peterson, supra note 123.
126. Weitzman, supra note 124 (over seventy percent loss for women and children; more than
twenty-five percent gain for men).
127. Finnie, supra note 47; Peterson, supra note 123. For a critique, see Braver & O'Connell, su-
pra note 122 (stating that the studies do not take into account fathers who share custody or the tax
consequences of child support for husbands and wives).
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women seem to suffer financially from loss of economies of scale relative
to couples that stay together. I28
There also have been a large number of careful studies over the last
twenty years on outcomes of divorce settlements."9 One of the interest-
ing things about these is that the outcomes are so similar even when the
families studied lived in quite different states. x3° The results, including
those of Mnookin himself,' seem to contradict predictions of the theo-
retical and well-known work of Mnookin and Kornhauser on the effect
of no-fault and "best interests" custody laws.'32
While I would assert that the financial effects of divorce on hus-
bands and wives are well known, I think further work needs to be done
on other costs of divorce. For example, I have already mentioned some
controversial longitudinal work done on the effects of divorce on chil-
dren. I33 We need more good studies on the effects of various custody
patterns on child outcomes, 134 the effects of divorce (other than finan-
cial)'35 on divorced men and women, and on the relative costs of divorce
and staying together. 36 Do statutory rules matter, or actual awards of
custody, or neither?'37 For example, worthwhile studies could focus on
the relative effects of custody law, judicial order, and time with children
128. BRINIG ET AL., supra note 5, at 1188; LENORE J. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMER-
ICA (1985).
129. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992); Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 98, at 294 tbl.2 (citing
other sources); Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621 (1991); Peters, supra note 104; Weiss
& Willis, supra note 119; Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM.
L.Q. 79 (1986). But compare Marsha Garrison, The Marriage Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1039
(1983).
130. Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6.
131. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 129.
132. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 98.
133. For example, see the Wallerstein materials cited in supra note 48.
134. For example, see the Hetherington, Cox and Cox materials cited in supra note 72. See gener-
ally AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 49.
135. For example, Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, "I Only Want Trust," Norms, Trust and
Autonomy (University of Iowa College of Law, Working Paper, 2001), available at papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=269289 (last visited Dec. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Brinig & Nock, Trust],
finds that noncustodial fathers, even accounting for divorce, were more depressed than those who did
not have children living away from them.
136. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SO-
CIAL PROBLEM (1996); LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); Hetherington
et al., Effects of Divorce, supra note 72; Whitehead, supra note 123.
137. See generally, e.g., MNOOKIN & MACCOBY, supra note 129; Brinig & Allen, supra note 35;
Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody, supra note 6; Brinig & Nock, Trust, supra note 135; Judith A. Seltzer,
Father by Law: Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Nonresident Fathers' Involvement with Children, 35
DEMOGRAPHY 135 (1998) [hereinafter Seltzer, Father by Law]; Judith A. Seltzer, Legal Custody Ar-
rangements and Children's Economic Welfare, 96 AM. J. SOC. 895 (1991) [hereinafter Seltzer, Legal
Custody Arrangements].
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on child outcomes such as happiness, lack of psychological problems, 3 8
grades, health,'39 relationship quality (attachment and bonding) with each
parent,"4 and later adult relationships with marital or other partners.141 It
might be very useful to explore (particularly from an alternative dispute
resolution perspective) whether the results differed if they were based
upon settled rather than litigated outcomes. 42
Another relatively unexplored area for those interested in empirical
law and economics involves family situations unrelated to divorce. For
example, a very important general question with application to adoption
and child placement generally 143 is whether good (as opposed to bad)
parents can be identified in advance.' 44 What characteristics will aid in
adoptive placement? 145 Will they be as effective in placement of disabled
children as with children without disabilities?'46 Further, what is the role
of information in adoption (as opposed to in contract, t47 for example)? 148
138. For example, the Iowa Adoption Study is interested in whether children have outcomes such
as substance abuse, alcoholism, psychosis, or antisocial personality. The study conducted by Remi
Cadoret, 08/01/89-03/31/04 Sponsor: US PHS-National Institutes of Health (NIH) Gene-Environment
Interaction in Etiology of Drug Abuse (Iowa Adoption Study), resulted in the creation of multiple
works. See generally Remi J. Cadoret, Adoption Studies, 19 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 195
(1995); Remi J. Cadoret & George Winokur, Depression Spectrum Disease, I: The Role of Gene-
Environment Interaction, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 892 (1996); Xiaojia Ge et al., The Developmental
Interface Between Nature and Nurture: A Mutual Influence Model of Child Antisocial Behavior and
Parent Behaviors, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 574 (1996); Thomas A. Widiger et al., DSM-IV An-
tisocial Personality Disorder Field Trial, 105 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1996). I would also be inter-
ested in whether these adopted children earned as much as those who were not adopted, divorced at
the same rate, abused their children, or were as highly educated.
139. See generally AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, PEDIATRICIAN'S ROLE IN HELPING CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES DEAL WITH SEPARATION AND DIVORCE, July 1994, available at http://www.aap.org/
policy/00297.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2001); Laura E. Montgomery et al., The Effects of Poverty,
Race and Family Structure on U.S. Children's Health: Data from the NJIS, 1978 Through 1980 and 1989
Through 1991, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1401 (1996).
140. Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody, supra note 6; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
DESCRIBING OUTCOMES OF JOINT CUSTODY (1995), available at http://www.acfc.org/study/asal-ocr.pdf
(last visited Dec. 12, 2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of Paternal
Bonding in the Law of Family Relations, 33 IND. L. REV. 691 (2000); Seltzer, Father by Law, supra note
137; Seltzer, Legal Custody Arrangements, supra note 137; Judith Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, Fathers
and Children, in ANTHOLOGY ON FATHERHOOD (S. Cath et al. eds., 1982).
141. Brinig & Buckley, Deadbeats, supra note 6; Josefina J. Card, Long Term Consequences of
Divorce for Children of Teenage Parents, 18 DEMOGRAPHY 137 (1981); R. Jean Haurin, Patterns of
Childhood Residence and the Relationship to Young Adult Outcomes, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 846
(1992); Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 72; Willis & Michael, supra note 62.
142. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 75, at 498; Joan B. Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Di-
vorce: Respondents' Perceptions of Their Processes and Outcomes, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1989, at
71,78 tbl.1.
143. Other child placement may involve foster care, group housing, or institutional care.
144. Brinig & Buckley, Ugly Duckling, supra note 57; Margaret F. Brinig, Choosing the Lesser
Evil (A Comment on Besharov), 144 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 205 (2001).
145. Currently, agencies screen for substance abuse, criminal records, marital stability, and com-
plaints of child abuse.
146. Brinig & Buckley, Ugly Duckling, supra note 57.
147. See BRINIG, CONTRACTTO COVENANT, supra note 4, at 68-70.
148. "Wrongful adoption" actions in tort will be successful if the agency withheld information it
had (and the parents requested it), at least as far as nondiscoverable defects are concerned. See id. at
69.
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Do open adoptions work as well149 from the child's perspective, as do
more traditional procedures where identities are kept confidential?150
What effects, if any, can we see from multiethnic placement? 1 ' Do they
differ depending upon whether foster, as opposed to adoptive, placement
is involved? 15 2 Finally, how do adoptive kids compare to those raised by
single parents? I53 How does kinship care (long term foster care place-
ment with relatives)154 compare with adoption of similar children by simi-
lar families?'55 In all of these cases, holding other things (particularly so-
149. See Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Open Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION
316, 318 (David Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990). At least the parties can see each
other and discuss family and health histories and aspirations. Because the relationship may continue
after relinquishment, there are greater incentives to be truthful. See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN
OPEN ADOPTION (1990); LYNN C. FRANKLIN & ELIZABETH FERBER, MAY THE CIRCLE BE UNBRO-
KEN: AN INTIMATE JOURNEY INTO THE HEART OF ADOPTION (1998); Carol Amadio & Stuart L.
Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to "Stay in Touch" with Blood Relatives, 22 J.
FAM. L. 59 (1983-84). Compare Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in As-
suring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (arguing that even without specific laws,
reputation will cause people to adhere to contracts), with RUTH G. McRoY, HAROLD D. GROTEVANT
& KERRY L. WHITE. OPENNESS IN ADOPTION, NEW PRACTICES, NEW ISSUES 117 (1988) (explaining
that the fact that birth and adoptive parents will have ongoing relationship encourages truthfulness);
Laurie A. Ames, Open Adoptions: Truth and Consequences, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 137 (1992)
(same); Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault, supra note 6 (arguing that most divorcing parents will have chil-
dren and hence need ongoing relationship); Nancy E. Dowd, A Feminist Analysis of Adoption, 107
HARV. L. REV. 913, 931 (1994) (arguing that open adoption facilitates relational interests of women).
150. See generally Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the New
York statute ordering the sealing of adoption records is constitutional); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751
(I11. 1981); JOSEPH J. CULLIGAN, ADOPTION SEARCHES MADE EASIER (1996); LOIS LOWRY, FIND A
STRANGER, SAY GOODBYE (1978) (describing a fictional account of an adopted child's attempts to
find her birth parents).
151. David Crary, Interracial Adoption Debate Plagues Family, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, July 3,
2000, at B20, available at 2000 WL 9351525 (The National Association of Black Social Workers
"shares a yearning to get black children out of foster care. But it says the priority should be to place
them with black families who have a better understanding of racism and black culture."); see also In re
Adoption No. 12612, 725 A.2d 1037 (Md. Ct. App. 1999); Arlo Wagner, Pixley Loses Custody, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at C1. The Judge in In re Adoption No. 12612 thought Mrs. Blankman "does not
have a sufficient understanding about Cornilous' black race." Id. at C2. The judge explained, "Simply
being 'colorblind' or feeling you are a person who is not conscious of the racial difference is not
enough." Id. Judge Scrivener further added that Cornilous needs to understand the "significance and
learn the 'pride in his race' as he grows older." Id. For some older contributions, see Margaret How-
ard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 517
(1984); Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordi-
nation, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33,42 (1993-94).
152. RICHARD KAGAN & SHIRLEY SCHLOSBERG, FAMILIES IN PERPETUAL CRISIS (1989); BETrY
R. MANDELL, WHERE ARE THE CHILDREN? A CLASS ANALYSIS OF FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION
(1973); Brinig & Buckley, Ugly Duckling, supra note 57; Madeleine L. Kurtz, The Purchase of Families
into Foster Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons They Teach, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1453 (1994).
153. Divorce itself, while it may be the best alternative for the adults involved, frequently has a
negative effect upon their children. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 123. For more quantitative de-
scriptions, see, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES, supra note 48; WALLERSTEIN &
KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP, supra note 48; Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce, supra note
72; Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 72; Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects, supra
note 48.
154. See Charlene Ingram, Kinship Care: From Law Resort to First Choice, 75 CHILD WELFARE
550, 550 (1996).
155. Rebecca Hegar & Maria Scannapieco, From Family Duty to Family Policy: The Evolution of
Kinship Care, 74 CHILD WELFARE 200 (1995). For a discussion, see BRINIG ET AL., supra note 5, at
263-82. For an application to Native Americans, see id. at 287-88.
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cioeconomic factors) constant is critical. There will also be debate about
what measures of success should be used for child outcomes.156 The de-
bate argues for collecting data with as many different measures as possi-
ble.
I mentioned above the interesting questions surrounding different
outcomes for parents with different sexual orientations. No one study
seems to have been accepted by both sides in the policy debate.'57 This
means that more high quality work by principal investigators who are in-
terested but do not otherwise have stakes needs to be done. Perhaps
only slightly less controversial will be studies involving gender differ-
ences in parenting.'58 Some have been completed (with some of the criti-
cisms directed at the same-sex couples studies), but longer horizon and
more complete work is needed. Finally, much more comprehensive work
will be required if we are to better understand and prevent elder abuse. 59
I have also hinted that more than either a law or an economics sen-
sitivity needs to be applied to family studies.t" ° I have found that working
with someone with a sociological background has refocused a number of
my efforts and that I have learned a great deal from the psychological lit-
erature as well. An example is the interrelationship between women's
labor force participation and rising divorce rates. Without seeing that
the patterns of market work changed before the divorce rate did, one
would be tempted to attribute more divorce to laxer divorce laws. This
misses an important factor.
CONCLUSION
Family law improves as policymakers know more about how fami-
lies work and particularly as they see how law affects family behavior.
Though research results surface in legal journals with increasing regular-
ity, many more studies need to be done. To be effective, the empirical
projects must meet normal scientific and statistical standards. Though
the work will be difficult and costly, large longitudinal studies that ask
the right questions are critical to avoid still more costly policy missteps.
156. See supra note 138 for discussion of the Iowa adoption study versus more traditional eco-
nomic criteria.
157. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
158. Many states expressly disavow the sex of the parent as a consideration in awarding custody.
This assumes both parents do equally well. For a discussion, see Frank, supra note 78.
159. A government study, released in 1998, on the incidence of elder abuse (estimating half a mil-
lion elderly Americans were abused in 1996), can be found at Administration on Aging, Elder Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Resources Page, available at http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/abuse/default.htm, as
can links to other sites. For an early look, see Brinig, Finite Horizons, supra note 6.
160. Several universities feature interdisciplinary centers for the study of families, including fam-
ily law. For example, see the Center on Child, Family and State at the University of Virginia, and the
Center for Children's Policy Practice & Research at the University of Pennsylvania.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
AVERAGE HOURS SPENT ON HOUSEHOLD TASKS BY HUSBANDS AND
WIVES
Household Task: Husbands Wives N Sig. T.
1) Preparing Meals 2.05 9.75 4377 .001*
2) Washing Dishes 1.76 6.07 4377 .001*
3) Cleaning House 1.59 8.13 4379 .001*
4) Outdoor Tasks 4.96 1.81 4380 .001*
5) Shopping 1.39 2.81 4380 .001*
6) Washing, Ironing 0.57 4.29 4379 .001*
7) Paying Bills 1.36 1.60 4378 .001*
8) Auto Maintenance 1.84 0.18 4379 .001*
9) Driving Others 1.15 1.39 4372 .001*
Male Tasks (4+8) 6.80 1.99 4375 .001*
Female Tasks
(1+2+3+5+6+7+9) 9.87 33.98 4381 .001*
* Paired Samples T-Test (2-tailed) is significant at p < .001
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Case 1: Wife married at 19,
husband at 26. They've been
married 20 years, and have
three kids. The husband gets
custody. Husband has 7 years
more education than the wife,
and they live in a fault state.
Wife is white. Probability that
wife files = .095.
However, if the wife got cus-
tody, the probability that she
would file increases to .69.
Case 2: They married when However, if the husband got
both were 26, and have been custody, the probability that the
married 5 years. They have two wife files would decrease to .32.
children, and the wife will get
custody. The husband finished
college and the wife a law de-
gree (three more years of edu-
cation). They live in a no-fault
state and wife is white. Prob-
ability that wife files =.79.
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TABLE 4
HOW MUCH DO THE NUMBERS MATTER?
